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With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, it has become more feasible to 
envisage a federal Europe through the establishment of an ‘ever closer union’ as a political entity. 
Although the recent EU appears more like confederal or intergovernmental than federal, the Lisbon 
Treaty makes it possible to postulate that the future integration process of the EU would be its advance 
toward a federal state. On the verge of ramification toward either a federal Europe or a durable 
confederation, the EU faces a critical agenda of democratic deficit, i.e., a lack of vertical 
accountability between European political elites and voluntarily participating European citizens. The 
current status of the EU is obviously unique in its structure of multi level governance. Sometimes this 
structure is evaluated positively, but the study of former confederations also indicates that a 
confederate system is not durable, and rather unstable and impermanent. If the EU wants to move in a 
federal direction beyond confederation, it should answer the question of democratic deficit, that is, how 
to find European citizens who are loyal enough to sustain an independent political community. This 
paper discusses a possible route for the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, especially with respect to issues 
related to the democratic deficit and to the necessity of devising a European constitution. 
 






Where is the European Union heading? Where might be the final destination for 
European integration? Despite some support for European statehood, it has been rather 
evident that the current status of the EU is not a federal state, but a union or a confederation 
consisting of sovereign member states which have agreed to delegate some of their 
sovereignty to the common institutions of the union for the interests of each member state. 
Nevertheless, with the effectuation of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009, it has 
become more feasible to envisage a federal Europe, that is, the establishment of an ‘ever 
closer union’ as a political entity. The Lisbon Treaty suggests at least four parameters that 
are essential if this ever closer union is to be realized. 
Firstly, the Treaty makes clear the jurisdiction of authority between the EU and member 
states through classification of three policy categories: exclusive, shared, and supporting 
competences. Exclusive competence entirely belongs to the EU, which includes a common 
monetary policy, a common tariff policy, a common trade policy, a competition policy in the 
EU market, and a participation in international treaties. By contrast, supporting competence 
belongs to the member states and includes domains of culture, tourism, education, sanitation, 
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and administrative cooperation. The EU and the member states then share the jurisdiction of 
authority in the areas of environment, transportation, energy, consumer protection, public 
health, public security, social policy, and agricultural & fishery policy. This classification 
confirms a certain trend where more policy domains, which previously belonged to the 
member states, are inevitably interconnected with the jurisdiction of the EU, especially in the 
areas of environment, social policy, and public security. More importantly this trend will 
become irreversible under the deepening and widening of the EU. 
Secondly, the treaty reinforces the supervision power of the EU over the macroeconomic 
policy of the member states. The European Central Bank has now become an official and 
independent institution and has expanded its jurisdiction over all member states including 
non Euro zone countries even though its power of monetary policy has been delayed to non 
Euro zone countries until they begin to use the Euro currency. The ECB’s decision-making 
procedure also adopts a qualified majority voting system instead of a consensus system, thus 
guaranteeing a rapid response to remove any uncertainty in the market. In addition, the 
European Commission in cooperation with the Eurogroup, which consists of treasury 
secretary of the member states, has the power of monitoring both the fiscal soundness and 
the fiscal deficits of the member states and issuing relevant warnings in these areas.   
Thirdly, the treaty aims to enhance efficiency as well as democracy in the decision- 
making process of the EU. The number of agenda which comes under the scope of unanimity 
is saliently reduced. More than 40 policy areas including common foreign & security policy, 
environmental policy, and mid-and-long term fiscal matters can now be decided under 
qualified majority voting, thus guaranteeing fast and efficient decision making. In addition, 
the treaty intends to introduce incrementally the double majority voting system beginning in 
2014 to prevent disadvantageous situations for small member states. Under this new voting 
system, a decision will require the double hurdle of at least 55 percent of member states, that 
is, 15 countries out of 27 member states as well as 65 percent of total EU population. Of 
course, every member state will still retain a veto power and can demand for unanimity over 
any new proposals or decisions in the fields of defense, foreign affairs, taxation, and civil 
and family law. But even in the areas of foreign and taxation policies the treaty tries to bring 
about common EU standards to protect European citizens and to maintain balance in direct 
and indirect taxes for importing products from the member states.   
Fourth and lastly, the treaty has reinforced the power of major institutions and tried to 
strike a balance of authority among them. It established the presidency of European Council 
with a two and half year tenure which is renewable for one term. It also introduced the 
position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with a 
five year tenure. This position, commonly called foreign minister, combines the former 
positions of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European 
Commissioner for External Relations. The newly appointed foreign minister is supported by 
the department of European External Action Service and plays the role as vice president of 
the European Commission. The standing position of presidency and foreign minister with a 
longer fixed tenure means that the EU, as an integrated political entity, might enjoy more 
stable and predictive relations with other countries.  
The European Parliament also became more influential with its increased size of 
members from 736 to 751 and through sharing co-decision making power with the Council 
of the EU in more than 70 issue areas including trade and commerce. Although the European 
Parliament previously ratified the president of the European Commission after decision of 
the Council of the EU, now it literally elects the president of the European Commission after 
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recommendation from the Council of the EU. In contrast, the European Commission has 
adjusted its authority through sharing power with the parliament and council on the one hand, 
and through reinforcing its supervising role over the member states on the other. It also has a 
plan to reduce its number of commissioners from 27 to 18 by the year of 2014 which makes 
the operation of the institution more efficient (Papier 2008; Li 2008; Yang and Lee 2009).  
All these characteristics of the Lisbon Treaty make it possible to estimate that the future 
integration process of the EU will advance it toward a federal state. The current status of the 
EU is obviously unique in its structure of multi-level governance. Sometimes this aspect is 
evaluated positively, but the study of former confederations also indicates that a confederate 
system is not durable, but rather unstable and quite temporary. The most important difference 
between a federal state and confederation is whether the central government and member 
states share sovereignty or not, especially in the areas of defense and taxation. The EU has 
no direct taxation rights over the European citizens and no standing army large enough to 
perform an independent military operation.   
In this regard, the EU is closer to a confederation at present even though it has some 
potential to move toward a federal state, in terms of institutional arrangements such as the 
standing presidency and the foreign minister position, expansion of exclusive competence 
policy category, and various efforts to enhance solidarity among European citizens. If the 
Lisbon Treaty aims to go in a federal direction beyond confederation, thus to create a single 
political community, it should answer the question of democratic deficit, that is, how to find 
European citizens who are loyal enough to sustain an independent political community. In an 
attempt to solve this problem, there is a suggestion for the necessity to devise a European 
constitution. Some scholars argue for the introduction of the constitution as a solution to 
democratic deficit, while others claim the democratic deficit itself makes the attainment of a 
constitution impossible.  
The existence of the growing Euro-scepticism which emphasizes no-demos thesis and the 
divisions among member states regarding various policy issues should not be overlooked 
during the process of European integration. In consideration of these differences for the 
future development of the EU, this paper discusses a possible route for the EU after the 
Lisbon Treaty, especially with regard to the issues related to the democratic deficit and the 
necessity of devising a European constitution. Section II explores various interpretations 
concerning the notion of a democratic deficit, section III analyses the call for a European 
Constitution as a means to overcome the democratic deficit, section IV contrasts diverse 
characteristics of federation and confederation as a possible result of the Lisbon Treaty with 
examination of the statehood of the EU, and finally, the future prospects for the EU including 




2. INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
 
Why is democratic deficit important in the discussion of the Lisbon Treaty? What does it 
mean by democratic deficit in the EU context? And why do we deal with the topic of state 
form in analyzing the EU’s democratic deficits? If the Lisbon Treaty drives the current 
Europe on the verge of ramification toward either a federal Europe or a durable 
confederation, there remains the critical aspect of democratic deficit. This matter comes out 
when the EU wants to transfer itself from an economic community based on consumers to a 
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political community based on citizens. The EU has already started to transform itself into a 
political community with various state apparatus since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. 
Accordingly, the EU as a political community has to achieve democratic legitimacy from 
European citizens in addition to economic benefit for European consumers.  
Democratic deficit has two meanings in the EU context. One is the lack of horizontal 
accountability among major institutions such as commission, council, and parliament. The 
other is a lack of vertical accountability between European political elites and voluntarily 
participating European citizens. Many scholars point out that the EU is suffering as a result 
of decisions that are insufficiently representative of, or accountable to, the nations and the 
people of Europe (Lord 2001: 165). Nevertheless, if the EU wants to remain as a durable 
confederation, that is, a loose network among member states, democratic deficit less 
seriously matters since the sovereign member state individually absorbs such demand. But if 
it targets a federal Europe with the centralized state apparatus through continuing 
establishment of new treaties, then it should answer the problem of democratic deficit, 
especially of the vertical accountability.  
As such, democratic deficit and the state form have close relations especially when the 
EU goes to the direction of federal Europe in which the central authority rather than the 
constituent units remain as the decisive force. The Lisbon Treaty as a diminished form of the 
2003 constitution for Europe suggests some solutions regarding horizontal accountability 
especially through reinforcing power of the European parliament. But when it stipulates a 
high level of institutional interconnectedness, there is no clear answer how to achieve 
corresponding commitment to those institutions from European citizens. In other words, the 
Lisbon Treaty takes an incomplete attitude toward a federal Europe without a clear answer to 
vertical accountability, namely a no European demos problem (Kim 2004: 281-302; Trenz 
2010: 93-115). 
With regard to the evaluation of a democratic system, Robert Dahl states that elected 
representatives, free and regular elections, freedom of expression, alternative information, 
associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship are all essential democratic criteria for a 
political unit as big as a state (Dahl 1998: 83-99). That being the case, the democratic deficit, 
especially the problem of vertical accountability, occurs when democratic institutions or 
organizations appear to fall short of fulfilling the principles of parliamentary democracy in 
their practices when representative and related parliamentary integrity is concerned 
(Levinson 2007: 859-860).  
In the context of EU operations, the democratic deficit signifies that the EU suffers from 
deficiencies in representation and it also reveals that the integration process of the EU 
contributes to the change of the member states to the extent that each member state can no 
longer claim to be the source of its own legitimacy (Eriksen and Fossum 2002: 401-424). A 
chain of representation through EU institutions is associated with the degree of diverse rights 
and powers that the European Parliament (EP) has since the voice of European people could 
be heard via individual members of the EP whose elections can be the channels for European 
citizens to express their interests and preferences over the EU policy areas (Holzhacker and 
Albaek 2007: 9-10). The EP, however, still has a limited influence on the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers, even though the power of EP is increasing under 
the Lisbon Treaty; thus the chain of representation is imperfect, rather exacerbating the 
problem of democratic deficit.  
Simon Hix suggests a solution to the institutional problem in two ways. One is a 
presidential system in which a president of the EU is chosen through direct election by 
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European citizens and he/she would lead the commission as the administrative pillar. The 
other is a parliamentary system in which a prime minister, who would sit at the head of the 
European Parliament, is chosen by EU citizens through a general election. Under this system, 
the current parliament could play the role as a lower chamber and the Council of the 
European Union as upper chamber. Eventually the EU would have the bi-cameral system 
with its own prime minister. If one of these systems is adopted, can the democratic deficit 
matter eventually be solved? (Hix 1997)     
Dimitris Chryssochoou interestingly differentiates an institutional perspective of the 
democratic deficit from a socio-psychological perspective. In an institutional perspective, 
questions are focused on ‘who governs and how?’ and accentuate the need for democratic 
power sharing which might give the EP a larger share in the EU decision-making process. In 
contrast, a socio-psychological perspective asks ‘who is governed?’ and focuses on the 
absence of European demos (Cini 2003: 365-381). Some scholars claim that the existence of 
European demos is not only possible, but also could be recognized on the basis of EU 
citizenship. The concept of EU citizenship was first introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and 
further developed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
One might assume that the democratic legitimacy of the EU is growing, considering 
Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which states, 
“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to 
and not replace national citizenship,” and “Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights… the 
right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in 
municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State” (European Commission 2008). This article certainly establishes 
European citizens, but it describes EU citizenship as an addition to the national citizenship, a 
by-product. In other words, it does not bring about European citizenship per se 
unconditionally.    
Furthermore, although the formation and development of EU citizenship exhibits the 
potential for the Union to improve the democratic governance at the supranational level, the 
EU decisions are becoming more remote from the citizens as a result of expansion of the 
Union, the incomplete as well as complex passage of representation and the multi-layered 
governance (Eriksen and Fossum 2000: 5). For instance, according to Eurobarometer 72 
conducted from October 23 to November 18, 2009, there is a high percentage of negative 
opinion about the EU (46% of negative opinion including 14% of no response) regarding the 
question ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?’ (European Commission 
2009) Without a sense of belonging among European citizens who share a common 
European identity and without ensuring the involvement of European citizens to a higher 
degree in the policy-making process, the further institutional or structural development of the 
EU could entail a fundamental instability for preserving the lasting existence of the EU, as a 
viable political entity. In other words, the reality appears that the EU is still suffering from a 
degree of democratic deficit, particularly in a socio-psychological perspective. 
By contrast, Andrew Moravcsik claims that the EU is democratically legitimate enough 
since the constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control through national 
governments, and the increasing power of the EP could all guarantee that the EU decision-
making process is transparent, effective and receptive to the needs of European people 
(Moravcsik 2002: 603-624). He also argues that it is necessary to compare the operations of 
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the EU to the actual functions of national democracies adjusted for a multi-level context in 
order to fairly analyze the problem. The EU is coexisting with much stronger nation states 
with regard to fiscal, administrative and legal power within multi-level governance. 
According to the concept of multi-level governance, the political system of the EU contains 
three characteristics: first, decision-making abilities are shared by actors at different levels 
through national and supranational institutions of the EU; second, a joint decision-making 
among states entails a loss of control for individual national governments; third, transnational 
stages appear as political arenas are interconnected rather than nested (Hooghe and Marks 
2001: 33-69).  
Given these circumstances, Moravcsik argues that democratic legitimacy can be  
interpreted in many ways. For example, decisions from the European Human Rights Court 
enjoy a high level of support even though the members of the Court are not directly elected. 
Sometimes the institution needs a distance from the complicated interests and that condition 
guarantees more stable legitimacy. Moreover, he insists that even though we admit the 
importance of people’s participation in the decision making process, it is not easy for the EU 
to have a high degree of response from the citizens since the EU has no jurisdiction over the 
issues in which people have direct interest, such as social policy, educational policy, and 
public security matters. He investigates innate substantive, fiscal, administrative, legal and 
procedural constraints on EU policies which are contained in several treaties and legislative 
provisions. Those conditions play the role as constitutional law for the Union as a 
multinational body in assuming less direct political participation.  
Moravcsik’s argument offers a very interesting justification for the vertical perspective of 
the democratic deficit. Nevertheless, he does not suggest any fundamental solution to the 
socio-psychological perspective of the democratic deficit that embraces the opportunity for 
the people to be informed, to comprehend, and to have their voice heard (Holzhacker and 
Albaek 2007: 8). As Kevin Featherstone argues, Jean Monnet’s initial design of an elitist and 
technocratic High Authority detached from any national interests is to some extent 
responsible for the current democratic deficit of the EU. In a sense, Moravcsik lines with 
Monnet’s idea that emphasizes the need of inevitable exclusion of people to some extent 
even though such exclusion has brought about the present European Commission that is short 
of accountability as well as democratic legitimacy, despite the fact that its status has been 
vital for the history of European integration (Featherstone 1994: 150-165). 
 
 
3. OVERCOMING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT:  
ADOPTING A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION? 
 
How then could the EU remedy its socio-psychological or vertical democratic deficit and 
to what degree will the European integration process continue? Interestingly, some scholars 
argue for the introduction of constitution as a good leverage to solve democratic deficit 
(Manncini 1998; Habermas 2001; Park 2007; Li 2008; Trenz 2010), while others claim the 
democratic deficit itself makes the achievement of a constitution not probable (Grimm 1995; 
Weiler 1998; MacCormick 2006; Kim 2008; Grimm 2009). Those who support the 
introduction of constitution believe that Europe can find new solidarity beyond cultural, 
regional, and ethnic differences through such a constitutional arrangement which is based on 
common democratic principles and values. If people share and practice some constitutional 
principles, this will eventually bring trust among people which is enough to sustain the EU as 
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a political community. Accordingly, they expect such a positive role from the Lisbon Treaty.  
By contrast, those who object the introduction of constitution argue that the EU’s 
legitimacy depends largely on the democracy of the member states, thus one should be 
careful to exhaust this national capital. This opponent position is more interested in 
collective civic identity and the extent to which there is a shared feeling of belongings among 
Europeans. Acknowledging the absence of a European demos, they insist that creating the 
constitution first without voluntarily participating European citizens means to place the 
carriage before horses. Such a statist short cut approach adopted in the early stage of 
European integration now left the negative legacy of how to invent citizens to justify the 
existence of the EU. Therefore, the EU’s priority at this stage should go not to create the 
constitution, but to further the path of transnational demos-formation under the role of the 
current nation state system. Accordingly, they suspect too much role of the Lisbon Treaty.  
As to the desirability of creating a constitution, Jürgen Habermas states that a European 
constitution would have a catalytic effect on strengthening democratic legitimacy of the EU 
by improving the capacity of member states to act collectively, not being biased toward the 
certain process or content of policies that might be adopted (Habermas 2001: 12). Besides, 
the constitutional protections secure particular interests of every citizen including those of 
minorities (Weale and Nentwich 1998: 43). Additionally, Scott Gordon also claims that a 
political entity is constitutional to the extent that it possesses institutionalized mechanisms 
for power control in order to preserve the freedom and interests of citizens, embracing those 
of minorities (Gordon 1999: 4). 
By definition, a constitution is ‘the set of fundamental rules governing the politics of a 
nation or sub-national body’ (Mclean and Mcmillan 2003: 117) and it restricts the state 
power while articulating the limits to individual liberty and social autonomy (Grimm 1995: 
287). Moreover, constitution-making refers to a ‘process of change in which the norms, 
principles, decision-procedures, and modes of justification that underpin and inform a written 
body of rules are presented, deliberated, and eventually encoded in a constitution’ (Blichner 
and Fossum 1997: 3). The demand for a European constitution primarily stems from the 
weak legitimacy of the Union, which is mostly drawn from legal acts of national 
governments that comprise the Council, the dominant policy-maker (Grimm 1995: 284).  
According to Habermas, democratic legitimization asks for two notions together: the 
mutual contact between institutionalized deliberation and decision-making within 
parliaments, courts, and administrative bodies on one side, and an inclusive course of 
informal mass communication on the other. He also argues that there is rationale for 
European countries to establish a powerful and influential union so long as they desire to 
regulate to a certain degree of the unwanted social, cultural, as well as economic 
consequences of globalism (Habermas 2001: 5-26). His view that the enhanced global 
economic competition would necessitate the building of an ever closer union seems credible, 
since globalization reveals that an individual state is too small to handle the comprehensive 
new challenges of international capital flows, technological transfer, environmental problems, 
immigration and refugees, and global warming, etc (Eriksen and Fossum 2000: 1-3). This 
situation has provided a rationale of an ongoing debate over whether the EU needs a 
constitution.  
MacCormick, however, argues that legal integration has not necessarily facilitated social 
integration. The new constitutional order does not guarantee that the emerging European 
polity will be similar to the supranational constitutional state or welfare state as Habermas 
expects. Rather it could be a ‘sectoral state’: a polity in which different policy spheres are 
 NAM-KOOK KIM AND SA-RANG JUNG  60 
 
governed by those most closely affected by or most interested in them, a development that 
has negative implications for democratic rule, legal authority and material equality in 
Europe’s future. In MacCormick’s view, Habermas minimizes the traumatic nature of 
previous transformations of the nation state and overestimates the accomplishments of the 
welfare state, and then too readily endorses the probability of supranational state at the 
European level (MacCormick 2006: 422-23). 
Dieter Grimm also emphasizes that it is unnecessary to create a European constitution, 
since institutional reforms can also be obtained by amending the Treaties — which the 
member states have made to develop the Communities — without changing them into a 
constitution. He further suggests that the legal binding of the ‘public power’ — the object of 
the legal norms incorporated in the treaties as well as in the member states’ constitutions —
executed by the European Community is not deficient, rather it covers the areas of the 
constitution at the national level by constituting the Community, setting its purposes and 
establishing its institutions while allocating its powers as well as directing its operations 
(Grimm 1995: 289). Above all, for Grimm, there are no European demos who justify the 
introduction of a European constitution and the transfer of sovereignty of the member states 
to the European Union. 
Nevertheless, those who support a European constitution argue that the EU could 
improve the accountability, transparency and the effectiveness of its operations, whereby 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Union, if such a constitution were drafted. 
Although the Union is not a state for whom constitutions normally build a legal footing, by 
establishing a European constitution which clarifies the separation of powers and the 
responsibilities among the institutions of the Union, the EU could have a much clearer voice 
and a greater influence that may be easily noticed in the international community. Even 
Grimm admits that ‘the Treaties lack a catalogue of fundamental rights bringing the relations 
between the Community and the natural and legal persons subject to it under the guiding 
principles of freedom and equality’ (Grimm 1995: 289), It might be justifiable to presume 
that a European constitution would guide the future development and the integration process 
of the Union by ensuring the observance of the rule of law in the EU, while elucidating the 
core rights and duties of European people as well as the powers and limits to the authority of 
the institutions. 
In reality, albeit the 2003 treaty establishing a constitution for Europe remains not ratified, 
the effectuation of the Treaty of Lisbon presents a fair possibility for augmenting the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. For example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union that ensures social, political, economic and religious rights and freedoms of 
EU citizens became legally binding under the Lisbon Treaty, which states, “Fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law (Article 6-3)” 
(European Commission 2008: 21). In addition, the EU became a legal body with the 
abolition of the pillar system, and thus the character of the EU appears to be transformed 
from a political entity into a legal entity (Chae 2009: 122), as the EU may sign treaties or 
become a member of international organizations thus assuming more effective action on the 
basis of increased legal certainty (Chae 2006: 33-34).  
Furthermore, the expansion of co-decision procedures to more policy areas could increase 
the competence of the EP in the legislative process, and the establishment of the European 
Citizens’ Initiative would offer an opportunity for European citizens to become directly 
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involved in EU matters during the legislative procedure. Besides that, by extending the 
application of double majority voting to new policy arenas, the Union could more faithfully 
reflect the interests and concerns of the citizens. These overall changes under the Treaty of 
Lisbon are expected to strengthen independently as well as collaboratively the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union. 
Despite the argument of Elazar that establishing and retaining a constitution is the 
foremost means of expressing the desire or will of a polity to be federal (Elazar 1987: 42) 
and in spite of the necessity for the EU to promote a democratic governance at the 
supranational level based on a robust legal ground, one could not be sure yet whether the EU 
satisfies the fundamental prerequisites for a union or an association of states for entering into 
a federation. To rectify the symmetry matter to be a federal state especially in regard to the 
overrepresentation of small states and the allotment of votes in the Council of Ministers, it is 
necessary to readjust the power of states and national parliaments by rethinking the authority 
of the Council and the Commission, whilst seeking the equalized influence of citizens by 
reflecting population size more reasonably in votes (Weale and Nentwich 1998: 43-44).  
Power and position of the EP is crucial for the representation of the people at the EU 
level, since the EP generates a direct supranational legitimacy, i.e., legitimacy transferred 
directly from the citizens to the supranational level (Warleigh 2003: 77-88). The EP’s multi-
level parliamentary field contains two channels of democratic representation directly through 
the European Parliament as well as indirectly through the national parliaments and 
governments. These two channels can be maintained under the Lisbon Treaty, thus both the 
European and the national parliaments can claim to represent citizens in the EU decision-
making (Crum and Fossum 2009: 249). Nevertheless, the EP has not gained more legitimacy, 
in part because the EU as a whole lacks public interest, and also because the significant stage 
of the co-decision procedure, that is, conciliation process, takes place behind the curtain, 
detaching the EP’s influence from the public view, even though the authority of the EP has 
been increasing, especially with the co-decision procedure which makes the EP and the 
Council approximately equal as legislators (Warleigh 2003: 78-90). 
 
 
4. FURTHER INTEGRATION OF THE EU:  
A FEDERAL EUROPE OR A DURABLE CONFEDERATION? 
 
Which destination then is the EU heading for if the Lisbon Treaty plays the role as a 
constitutional framework to reduce democratic deficit and to enhance the effectiveness of its 
operation? Is it a federal Europe with the centralized state apparatus or a durable 
confederation as a loose network among member states? In order to predict the future 
development of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, it is important to check the relations 
between democracy and constitution. Democracy definitely needs a constitution especially in 
a heterogeneous polity in terms of culture, religion and ethnicity. There would be various 
forms of constitutionalism to foster democracy. Sometimes, unwritten constitution can work 
in a relatively homogeneous polity like Britain. In contrast, the EU as a multinational 
community needs the constraint effect of written constitution as a publicly declared principle. 
The 2003 draft establishing a constitution for Europe was a good example of the positive 
position toward the role of constitution even though it soon faced ‘period of reflection’ 
following the rejection of ratification in France and Netherlands (Pang 2006; Chun 2007).  
Numerous treaties in the history of the EU assume that such institutional frameworks can 
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enhance efficiency and transparency, thus eventually bring about a higher level of democracy. 
This institutional approach also assumes that even European collective identity can be 
attained not as the basic infrastructure of a European democracy, but as a contingent by-
product of democratic practice. The Lisbon Treaty presupposes the same confidence in the 
emergence of the democratic agency as a consequential effect of dealing with shared 
concerns (Trenz 2010: 94-95). But this constitutional position cannot be the only 
authoritative perspective. According to Barents, the popular concept of an integrated legal 
order appears to be a limited paradigm. The constitutional approach which aims to override 
all differences may urge a choice between two options and distort legal reality insufficiently 
explaining the two way interaction or convergence between the two orders. The concept of 
constitutional pluralism, on the other hand, can offer an escape from the binary prison of 
monism (Barents 2009: 445-446). 
The historical political development of the EU reveals the ideological or theoretical 
conflicts between ‘intergovernmentalism,’ which favors the role of national states as a major 
drive for the European integration and thereby emphasizes the characteristic of the EU as 
more of a confederation, a type of union in which the constituent units rather than the central 
authority remain as the decisive force (Forsyth 1981: 171-181), and ‘supranationalism’ 
which values power delegated from member states to the authority of supranational 
institutions under the Union during the integration process, whereby focusing on the 
characteristic of the EU as more of a federation. In line with this, under an intergovernmental 
approach, national democracies need to be adjusted for the role of legitimizing the Union, in 
accordance with national electorates and national parliaments who ratify treaties and create 
governments which make decisions in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. 
Under a supranational approach, democracy at the Union level could assume a European 
electorate with the European parliament maintaining a significant power for the leadership of 
the union (Beetham and Lord 1998: 59-60, 74).  
Nevertheless, it is not a simple task to judge whether the EU belongs to the category of 
confederations or that of federations. King defines federation as ‘an institutional arrangement, 
taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other such states solely by the 
fact that its central government incorporates regional units into its decision-making 
procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis’ (King 1982: 77) In the context of the 
European integration, federalism is a specific form of political integration based on a simple 
maxim ‘unity in diversity’, which means in cases when the member states want to act 
independently diversity will predominate, whereas if unity is demanded by common consent, 
then the EU will act subsequently (Cini 2003: 65-78). On the other hand, as a framework for 
the European integration process, confederation is a particular type of intergovernmental 
arrangement in which national sovereignty is preserved unscathed in spite of the building of 
common institutions (O’Neill 1996: 71, 87). Confederation is also defined as a ‘union of 
states’ within a polity, contrary to a federation which is a ‘union of individuals’ in a polity 
(Wiener and Diez 2004: 30). 
In what specific aspects then do confederations vary from federations? Some general 
features of a confederation can be described as follows (Lister 1996: 33-34): first, a 
confederation unites states while leaving their statehood intact; second, a confederation 
unites states whose people are too heterogeneous to shape federal unions; third, a 
confederation needs a written basic law legally binding upon the member states; fourth, a 
confederation offers a minimum mandate which leaves most governmental powers to be 
executed autonomously by member states; and last, a confederation needs huge support from 
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the people of member states based on their confidence that such a bond would magnify the 
security and economic growth of their own country. A federation, on the contrary, is itself a 
state based on the ‘self-rule and shared rule’—in which constituent units have agreed to 
transfer their sovereignty in matters of common interest while maintaining their autonomy in 
matters of local interest—rooted in a written and supreme constitution. Additionally, a 
federation has a supreme court who regulates the relations among the constituent units 
themselves, as well as between the central authority and the constituent units (Burgess 2000: 
268).  
The present EU appears to have more characteristics of confederation than federation, 
because its member states possess a great autonomy and power in making and practicing 
crucial decisions associated with social welfare such as health, culture, education and 
employment, i.e., spheres that would have a direct influence on the lives of citizens, and 
policies concerning foreign affairs, security and defense issues, spheres that might impinge 
on the critical part of the national sovereignty. Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity, the 
principle of proportionality, opt-outs and veto rights all allow the member states to enjoy a 
huge degree of independence in defining their own positions regarding the policy areas of 
their interests.   
It is necessary to ponder the relative merits and demerits of confederation and federation 
in order to predict the future political development of the EU. Historically, confederate 
systems have turned out to be relatively non-durable, and confederations have oftentimes 
been regarded as transitional or unstable due to their inefficiency in decision-making 
processes and their lack of mechanisms to ensure the execution of the common policies 
brought in by member states (J. Kim 2008: 143-169). For example, regarding the 
implementation of decisions, while in federations it is executed either by the central 
government or by regional governments according to circumstances, in confederations it is 
always carried out by member states, which might cause critical problems when the 
uniformity of implementation is questioned (Lister 1996: 43). In the formation and the 
execution of the budget, confederations frequently suffer from budgetary deficits as they lack 
funds or contributions collected from regional governments, while in federations the central 
and regional governments each may levy a tax on the citizens. Moreover, with regard to 
dispute settlement mechanisms, disputes among the leaders of member states of a 
confederation, which take place relatively often and which might bring about grave 
consequences for the union, are usually handled via arbitrary procedures. Conversely, in 
federations, disputes which would be managed by the federal and national courts are rarely 
so severe and rarely endanger the existence of the federal union (Lister 1996: 41). 
Consequently, several former confederations such as the United States of America under the 
Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), Swiss Confederation (1815-1848), and German 
Confederation (1815-1866) have transformed into federations.  
Nonetheless, Lister suggests four contemporary possible applications of confederal 
institutions (Lister 1996: 49): first, in order to fortify their economic power, some groups of 
small states may want to build confederal-type unions; second, some multiracial states 
imperiled by separation may want to try confederal institutions; third, groups of neighboring 
states may attempt to form confederal ties for optimizing the gains from an interdependent 
world economy and for the collective security; fourth and lastly, for the whole global 
community, the confederal model could be helpful to handle the probable dangers lying 
before it more effectively. In particular, he argues that confederation would be an admissible 
alternative in forming a closer union for groups of states for whom the federal model is not 
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yet viable. However, Lister admits at the same time that when the member states are 
threatened from abroad militarily or economically, confederal unions have more chances of 
success, but when those threats disappear they tend to be weakened, and that several 
historical confederations actually became firm unitary or federal states (Lister 1996: 31-47). 
Therefore, even though the current EU seems more confederal or intergovernmental than 
federal, the future evolution of the Union would likely lead to a federal Europe, considering 
the historical cases and various characteristics of confederations and federations. Above all, 
the EU clearly shares in various ways some of the above-mentioned weaknesses of 
confederations. The process of decision-making and executing the policies via EU 
institutions—among whom the separation of powers is obscure—is quite complicated and 
inefficient because of the contrasting opinions among the institutions as well as among 
member states. As well, although the EU has its own resources as the budget for its own use, 
the Union cannot directly tax the people, and its revenue is not sufficient enough to 
implement diverse social policies.  
Although the dispute settlement via the Court of Justice which has a strong judicial 
authority on the arena of Community competence shows the federal feature of the EU, the 
execution of judgments of the Court relies mostly on the member states’ enforcement 
agencies (Pinder and Usherwood 2007: 56-58), which restrain the legal capacity of the Union. 
These diverse weaknesses of the EU resulting from the confederal characteristics reveal that 
the pursuit of a federal Europe could be an aim in the future for the Union. Moreover, 
according to Monnet’s vision of a federal Europe, the formation of specific functional links 
among constituent states without directly challenging the national sovereignty would make 
possible and facilitate the Union’s approach to federation, and by virtue of the mutual 
interests and benefits derived from collaborative economic activities, the creation of 
solidarity among people, from whom a federation would gradually emerge, becomes feasible 
(Wiener and Diez 2004: 35-37). Besides, federal constitutions might commence with some 
treaties among states which demand ratification—as in the cases of the United States and 
Switzerland—but successful federal unions would presume the characteristics of a state 
before long (Lister 1996: 19). 
That being so, in order to visualize the design of a European federal state, some general 
features of a state must be contemplated. In regard to the concept of statehood, Dunleavy and 
O’Leary describe various characteristics of a modern state (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 2): 
first, the state is a separate institution or a set of institutions, distinguished from the rest of its 
society to form an identifiable public; second, the state is the sovereign power within its 
territory as well as the supreme authority for all law; third, the state’s sovereignty extends to 
all individuals within its territory and pertains to those in official posts of government or 
decision-making; the state also has the power to impose taxes upon its population for funding 
its activities. In addition, Dosenrode suggests that the state has the authorized monopoly to 
supervise foreign relations, and a modern state should be based on a core culture which is 
common to the majority of all citizens in order to ensure its stability and durability 
(Dosenrode 2007: 20).  
Considering these characteristics of a state, the EU seems to gradually embracing more 
features of a federal state. In particular, with the Treaty of Lisbon coming into force, the 
Union is ostensibly moving toward the building of an ever closer union. For instance, the 
creation of a President of the European Council and a High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would help to maintain the consistency of EU policies 
and increase the efficiency of the operations of EU institutions. In addition, by demanding 
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the recognition of ‘mutual solidarity’ during the implementation of EU policies regarding 
security, defense and energy problems, the Union could express a more coordinated voice 
toward the international society while enhancing a sense of unity among the member states.  
Besides, the Lisbon Treaty makes clear distinctions regarding the distribution of powers 
between the EU and the member states by classifying their competences to carry out actions 
to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States,’ and on the basis of 
these competences the EU and the member states may act alone or jointly in different areas. 
Moreover, under the ‘area of freedom, security and justice,’ the EU handles diverse issues 
such as a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control; measures to 
prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia; measures for coordination and 
cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, the 
mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and the approximation of criminal laws, 
and so on (European Commission 2008: 75).  
These various arenas managed at the Union level as well as the growing authority of the 
EU, ostensibly, together indicate the EU’s progress toward a more united political and social 
entity, and if the Treaty of Lisbon produces its intended or desired outcomes, a vision for a 
federal Europe might actually be realized. Interestingly, Mancini (1998), in his article 
‘Europe: The Case for Statehood,’ also claims that a European federal state is not only 
conceivable but also feasible, ‘if the march towards an ever closer union between the peoples 
of Europe is to continue,’ and ‘if the peoples of Europe are to preserve the constellation of 
values informing their ways of life.’ He further argues that a European state would be able to 
have influence on the global market with the exercise of Europe’s huge economic power 
(Mancini 1998: 29-42), a fact the EU is already demonstrating well with a strong euro in the 
international financial market. 
Nevertheless, there still exists skepticism against the statehood of the EU and 
disagreement among member states regarding the benefits from their EU membership and 
the extent to which they support decision-making process at the supranational level. For 
example, Grimm claims that because of the absence of a European communication system 
due to the language diversity, ‘there will be neither a European public nor a European 
political discourse for the foreseeable future,’ and as a result, transforming the Union into a 
federal State cannot be in the short term a desirable goal (Grimm 1995: 290-300; Grimm 
2009: 353-373). Furthermore, Joseph Weiler argues that statehood is not an essential answer 
in solving the democratic problem of the EU. He criticizes Mancini’s opinion of the ‘Case 
for Statehood’ on the ground that it is never elucidated how and why statehood could settle 
the problems of democratic governance and why they could not be solved without the 
existence of a state (Weiler 1998: 43-62).  
Euro-skeptic attitudes in individuals, regions and nations are manifested in refusals to 
offer more legitimate power to supranational institutions to deal with policy issues (Lubbers 
and Scheepers 2005: 223-242; Lock 2009: 407-408). There are also discrepancies between 
European elites and citizens in the support of different aspects of European integration. The 
public want to Europeanize market-sided policies while elites conceive of European 
integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the level of nation 
states (Hooghe 2003: 281-304). However, if the EU gains more competence to facilitate the 
implementation of its regional and social policy, thus incorporate various policy issues 
related directly to employment, poverty, education, and general welfare of EU citizens, this 
means that the EU eventually has the increased social support, cooperation and the unity 
among European citizens.  
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According to Habermas, the buildup of democratic legitimacy of the EU based on the 
formation of a European-wide public sphere, i.e., “a network that gives citizens of all 
member states an equal opportunity to take part in an encompassing process of focused 
political communication” (Habermas 2001: 17) appears to be both desirable and viable. Due 
to the creation of the borderless zone by the Schengen Agreement, through which European 
people may enjoy equal opportunities of employment and education like local citizens within 
the member states, the EU has stepped into a sort of life community beyond a simple 
economic community. In addition, the increased movement of European people over the 
physical national borders would naturally entail the increased stakes, concerns and common 
interests shared by the people, and this social cohesion and interdependence may necessitate 
the spontaneous construction of a pan-Europe public sphere. Howe also suggests that with 
the coming of increased pluralism, multiculturalism and individualism, contemporary 
societies would produce a sense of identity which derives more from shared values and 
beliefs than shared group experience, and as a result, structure, in this case the EU, will form 
identity by its very existence and its constant use, whilst difference may count less than the 





Despite the inherent structural obstacles the EU faces as a multinational community, 
current study of federal and confederal models indicates that the future integration process of 
the EU would be its advance toward a federal state, and the establishment of an ever closer 
union. According to the historical perspective on the development of democratic entity in 
Dahl’s explanation, the present Europe belongs to the third transformation out of the three 
stages which consist of: first, the transition from the undemocratic city-state to the 
democratic city-state; second, the democratization of the nation-state, moving toward the 
representative and republican state; and third, the democratization of institutions on the 
transnational level beyond the nation-state (Dahl 1989: 1-8, 313). But, this third stage 
transformation is not simple. Schmitter argues that today’s EU is “a complex entity, a 
mixture of supranational, transnational, transgovernmental and intergovernmental structures” 
(Schmitter 1996: 4). As Larry Siedentop points out, the present EU seems to be “a new 
political form, something more than a confederation, but less than a federation” (Siedentop 
2000: 1). 
However, under the Lisbon Treaty, by promoting various social policies and programs at 
the union level, whilst attempting to coordinate the conflicting opinions among member 
states, especially those concerning the domains of foreign affairs and security, the EU could 
develop a single voice toward the international community, rising as a global actor, thus 
proceeding continuously to build a political entity (Koehler 2010: 71-72). In the course of 
this political and social integration, it is vital to create a sense of unity among European 
citizens in order to surmount diverse problems related to the democratic deficit. The Lisbon 
Treaty as a kind of constitutional foundation may play the role to overcome such a matter of 
horizontal and vertical accountability, thus to bring a more integrated federal state.  
In the deepening as well as widening of European integration, one remaining concern is 
the possible negative characteristics of a federal Europe. The federal state does not simply 
mean a reproduction of an exclusive nature of nation state in giant size. It would be desirable 
for the EU to be a new experiment for the framework of peace beyond modern nation state 
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system. Negatively or positively, one of unique characteristics of the EU is its multi-level 
decision-making system which is different from a hierarchical nation state one. If the EU 
turns into a strong federal Europe with a hierarchical decision making system, thus a federal 
Europe, a fortress Europe removing any differences among member states, which eventually 
makes the wall between Europe and non-Europe higher and reinforces the characteristic of 
the EU as another neo imperial hegemon of the world, it would be difficult to discern the 
EU’s development as a new experiment of peace from another realistic compromiser across 
the Atlantic oceans (N. Kim 2008).  
Nobody wants to see such a deterioration of the European Union. The need of an efficient 
single voice cannot override democracy even though we need a strong political control tower 
to rectify the result of economy driven laissez faire globalization. The recent effectuation of 
the Treaty of Lisbon seemingly displays a prospect for the EU to move further to a more 
integrated political union. But in the end, whether the Union is deemed to be a confederation 
or a federation is less significant than the deliberation and trials for making the EU a more 
durable democratic entity, operating effectively based on the rule of law and the consensus of 
citizens. This would be what Alain Lipietz referred to as the ‘dream scenario’: ‘a different 
Europe is possible, one that is ecological, social and democratic in its overall decisions, but 
regionally diverse in its life-styles; tames blind market forces through a common base of 
social rights and ecological duties and mobilizes its financial and technical resources to make 
standards of living equal in different regions’ (Lipietz 1993: 512). 
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